New Article on the Precarious Legitimacy of Transnational Trade Governance

Prof. Christian Joerges of the Hertie School of Governance and I recently finished our work on a book chapter that examines the impact of modern trade agreements on democratic policy-making and the ways in which their effects on national governance can be legitimised. The new paper (SSRN download link) is based on a previous version with a slightly different focus that was extensively rewritten by us over the last months. The final version will be published in the forthcoming Research Handbook on the Sociology of International Law edited by Moshe Hirsch and Andrew Lang in the coming months.

A Conflicts-Law Response To The Precarious Legitimacy Of Transnational Trade Governance

The abstract: 

This paper discusses the fundamental tensions between economic globalisation and democratic politics in the field of international trade. New bilateral and regional trade agreements increasingly incorporate other ‘trade-related’ policy areas and threaten to constrain state action and democratic politics. The move towards deeper and more comprehensive trade deals has greatly accentuated grievances and is of exemplary importance in the realms of transnational governance. We examine the decoupling of these agreements from national and democratic control and the resulting legitimacy impasses of transnational governance, based upon the theoretical frameworks of Karl Polanyi and Dani Rodrik. Arguing that politics is not a mistake that gets in the way of markets, we submit our own conceptualisation of transnational legitimacy. In doing so, we suggest a new type of conflicts law which does not seek to overcome socio-economic and political diversity by some substantive transnational regime, but responds to diversity with procedural safeguards, thus ensuring space for cooperative problem-solving and the search for fair compromises.

 

New Article on the Precarious Legitimacy of Transnational Trade Governance

Read my new Article in the Strategic Trade Review

STR-Article

I just received the good news that my research article on the state of export controls for cyber-surveillance technologies was published. Here’s a direct link to my article in the Strategic Trade Review, a peer-reviewed journal that specialises on topics such as trade in dual-use items and strategic goods, nonproliferation and sanctions. 

The article incorporates some findings of my Master’s thesis at the Hertie School of Governance, which discussed the same issue from a much broader perspective. I also recently received an ‘Aquila Ascendens’ award for my thesis work. My thesis advisors were Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Ischinger, Chairman of the Munich Security Conference and Professor at the Hertie School of Governance, and Dr. Ben Wagner, who is now a researcher at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin. 

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Want to know what ‘cyber-surveillance technologies’ are before reading the article?

Good question. There is no universally accepted definition and this is part of the problem. The European Commission recently proposed to include all items “specially designed to enable the covert intrusion into information and telecommunication systems with a view to monitoring, extracting, collecting and analysing data and/or incapacitating or damaging the targeted system.” (see pp. 91-92 of my article). Admittedly, this definition is a little more complicated than one might hope and remains both too vague and too broad to act as a good basis for export controls. What is basically meant is a cluster of heterogeneous (and very often dual-use) technologies that in the end all contribute to surveillance, but work very differently and come into play at different stages of the surveillance process. Here is a brief overview of products that various actors in the debate identify as cyber-surveillance technologies:

CyberSurveillanceTechs

The abstract of my new article:

The global trade in cyber-surveillance technologies has largely evaded public scrutiny and remains poorly understood and regulated. European companies play a central role in the proliferation of a broad spectrum of advanced surveillance systems that have legitimate uses, but have also been repurposed for nefarious ends. Export controls have developed into an important instrument to restrict sales of cyber-surveillance equipment and software to repressive regimes; however, these technologies pose significant challenges to traditional frameworks for the control of dual-use exports. This article provides an overview of current developments on the European level and within the multilateral Wassenaar Arrangement and presents the current state of export controls on cyber-surveillance technology. Most importantly, it discusses the outcome of the EU export control policy review, focusing on the regulation proposed by the European Commission in September 2016, and provides an initial assessment of the key innovations and limitations of the draft text. In addition, the article presents an analysis of the current debate regarding the problematic definition of ‘intrusion software’ in the Wassenaar Arrangement and offers insights into some alternative proposals.

 

Read my new Article in the Strategic Trade Review

Fair handeln

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In vielen afrikanischen Ländern herrscht Armut, ihre Einwohner sehnen sich nach einem besseren Leben – und flüchten. Schaffen neue Handelsabkommen Abhilfe?

Gastbeitrag für das Magazin enkelfähig zusammen mit Clara Weinhardt

Seit 15 Jahren verhandelt die Europäische Union mit Ländern in Afrika, der Karibik und dem Pazifik über Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen (EPAs). Viele afrikanische Handelspartner befürchten jedoch Nachteile aus der eigenen Marktöffnung. 2014 wurden zwar mehrere regionale EPAs in Afrika unterzeichnet; die Kontroversen reißen jedoch nicht ab. Aus Sorge um die eigene Industrialisierung weigern sich Staaten wie Nigeria und Tansania, die bereits verhandelten Abkommen zu ratifizieren.

Und tatsächlich können sie sich in einigen Bereichen negativ auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung auswirken. Dabei sind weniger die Handelsgrenzen der EU das Problem, denn die Abkommen sehen weitgehende Zollsenkungen vor. Risiken birgt stattdessen die Marktöffnung, zu der sich die afrikanischen Partner im Gegenzug verpflichten.

Schokolade statt Kakaobohnen

Der Abbau eigener Handelsgrenzen verspricht zwar günstigere Importe, ver­ringert aber das Exportpotenzial. Der flexible Einsatz protektionistischer Maßnahmen, wie etwa Steuern, wäre für afrikanische Länder deshalb wichtig, um eine Marktöffnung mit der gezielten Förderung einzelner Sektoren zu verbinden, deren Wertschöpfungspoten­zial hoch ist. Wertschöpfung bedeutet: anstelle von Rohstoffen wie Zucker oder Kakaobohnen weiterverarbeitete Produkte wie Schokolade zu exportieren, deren Marktwert um ein Vielfaches höher liegt.

EPAs erschweren es jedoch, Steuern auf den Export von Gütern wie Rohstoffen einzusetzen. Äthiopien zum Beispiel hat diese in der Vergangenheit erfolgreich als Anreiz für eine Weiterentwicklung der eigenen Lederindus­trie genutzt. (Dazu hier mehr von mir – FB.) Viele afrikanische Länder haben dennoch ein EPA abgeschlossen, insbesondere um dem drohenden Verlust von zollfreiem Marktzugang in die EU zu entgehen.

Die EU betont, dass die EPAs im Vergleich zu anderen Handelsabkommen weiter reichende Schutzklauseln und Ausnahmen enthalten. Das ist richtig, kann aber nicht in allen Fällen die Risiken auffangen. Zwar konnten die afrikanischen Staaten rund 20 Prozent des Handelsvolumens von der Marktöffnung ausnehmen; diese Ausnahmen betreffen vor allem landwirtschaftliche Produkte.

Doch in Zukunft könnte es für viele afrikanische Staaten sinnvoller sein, Produkte der weiterverarbeitenden Industrie zu schützen. Die Länder, die ein EPA unterschrieben haben, sollten bei der Umsetzung darauf drängen, dass die angekündigte Überprüfung der Abkommen tatsächlich verwirklicht wird. Auf diese Weise ließen sich bei negativen Auswirkungen zumindest Anpassungen anmahnen.

Afrikanische Regierungen sind gefordert

Es wäre jedoch zu einfach, die EPAs zum zentralen Entwicklungshindernis der afrikanischen Partner zu stilisieren. Die individuellen nationalen Rahmenbedingungen spielen eine zentrale Rolle für wirtschaftliches Wachstum und soziale Gerechtigkeit. Viele Regierungen haben ihren eigenen Spielraum in der Vergangenheit nicht genutzt. Mit anderen Worten: Die afrikanischen Länder müssen auch eigene soziale, politische und wirtschaftliche Reformen initiieren und umsetzen.

Die Grundidee der EPAs, handelspolitische Reformen anzuregen, ist zukunftsweisend, aber der Impuls für eine strategische Neuausrichtung einer nationalen Ökonomie kann nicht von außen kommen. Viele afrikanische Regionen sind gerade erst dabei, eine eigene handelspolitische Strategie zu entwickeln. Der Druck der EU, die Abkommen dennoch abzuschließen, könnte somit kontraproduktive Auswirkungen haben, weil einige Länder schlicht noch nicht dazu bereit sind.

Fair handeln

A Glimpse at Diversity in the German Parliament

In light of the upcoming German federal elections in September 2017, I take a brief look at the age and gender distribution in the German Parliament, the Bundestag, from its establishment in 1949 to the last general election in 2013. The figure below sums up the most interesting findings, starting with the observation that while the age composition changed over time, the average age of the representatives stayed almost constant over the past seven decades (indicated by the blue line at the margins and the corresponding values). In addition, it highlights that the number of female representatives has risen considerably from a meagre 28 out of 382 members in the 1st Bundestag (1949-1953) to 230 out of 631 in the current (18th) term.

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Source: own figure based on official data made available on the Bundestag website

The figure above remains a draft and will certainly require some more work. However, it shows very clearly how the size of the parliament evolved over time – a particularly interesting observation is the increase in size of the Bundestag following the German re-unification in 1990, which ballooned the parliament from 519 to 662 seats.

If this made you curious about the data, but you feel overwhelmed by the first graph (or are concerned about the perceptual problems associated with the combination of polar coordinates with stacked bar charts), you might like the cleaner, less ornamental figures below:

Continue reading “A Glimpse at Diversity in the German Parliament”

A Glimpse at Diversity in the German Parliament

Global Trends in Regime Development and Democratisation

I recently worked with a few fascinating datasets that describe the transformation and democratisation of national governments over the last decades. Based on this very comprehensive data, this post discusses important trends in global regime development from 1972 to 2015 and also provides a few more detailed graphs for Africa, which is the focus of my current research for the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA). See here for some of my previous work at GIGA.

As the data below shows, the global political landscape has changed significantly over the last decades. A large majority of countries made considerable progress in liberalising their political systems and establishing democratic institutions. Regularly scheduled and increasingly competitive elections have become the norm and most countries are now governed by constitutions that are – at least on paper – more or less democratic. However, authoritarian rule has persisted or reappeared in many regions of the world and this has led to different trajectories in regime development. Some seasoned observers even argue that democratic progress has slowed significantly and that the last wave of democratisation might now be succeeded by a long phase of stagnation and decline.

RegimeDevelGlobalBase

Source: Own calculation based on the variable ‘regime1ny’ in Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius (2013); see their codebook (and below) for more information on the data. 

The figure above summarises the changes in the type of government for a large majority of countries between 1972 and 2010. In particular, it shows the slow but steady increase in the number of democracies, highlights the sudden post-Cold War transformation from one-party to multiparty regimes and hints towards the stagnation of democratic progress over the last decade.

Comparing this with ‘raw’ data from the Freedom House Index (FHI, on which the categorisation in Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius (2013) is partly based), we can identify similar trends when it comes to both civil liberties and political rights. In the FHI, a country is assigned two ratings each year – one for political rights and one for civil liberties. Each is rated between 1 and 7, with 1 representing the greatest degree of freedom (!) and 7 the smallest degree of freedom. Below you find what is called a ‘violin plot’ that summarises the development in both ratings for the FHI. The figure shows the distribution of cases from 1975 to 2015 in five-year intervals. The black diamonds depict the average score in the given year across all countries; the horizontal black lines describe the quantiles.

We can clearly identify a significant strengthening of citizens’ civil liberties and political rights. For example, in 1975 more than half of all countries were rated 5 or worse in political rights and only one-quarter received a score of 3 or better, but this situation reversed dramatically: in 2015, only about one-quarter received a rating of 5 or worse and almost half of all countries were rated 3 or better (one-quarter was even rated 2 or better). The average in both rankings also decreased by more than one point between 1975 and 2005 (also between 1975 and 2015). More recently, averages slightly increased again, but at least the median for political rights in 2015 shows that this might primarily be due to some extreme cases rather than an overall retreat of democracy.

FHIIndicatorDevel

Source: Own calculation based on FHI data (1975-2015)

Of course, reducing the very broad spectrum of real-world government types to a few (more or less distinct) regime categories simplifies the issue and many interesting questions remain unanswered. One of these questions is, for example, whether ‘multiparty regimes’ – which technically still are authoritarian regimes – have become more democratic since 1990. I try to provide an initial answer to this question below by looking at the size of the majority that the governing party enjoys in the country’s legislative assembly. This offers a relatively good indication of the level of political contestation (openness of the political system and electoral competitiveness) in the country as well as of the strength of the domestic opposition. A lot has been written on the emergence of ‘electoral authoritarian regimes‘ or ‘competitive authoritarianism‘, but this post is not a (good) literature review.

[Also see below for figures on regime development in Africa.]

Continue reading “Global Trends in Regime Development and Democratisation”

Global Trends in Regime Development and Democratisation

The Economic Impact of Sanctions against Russia on EU Member States

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While attending a workshop on international sanctions a few weeks ago, I was fortunate to meet the author of the fascinating and very recent article “The Redistributive Impact of Restrictive Measures on EU Members: Winners and Losers from Imposing Sanctions on Russia“. Much has been written on EU-Russia relations following the crisis over Ukraine and important obstacles to a rapprochement remain; however, there have been few other detailed assessments of the economic impact of the sanctions, countersanctions and geo-political uncertainty on EU member states. Because the magnitude of the overall economic effects was a surprise to me – trade contracted by over a third for almost all EU member states and by much more for some members since 2013 – I couldn’t resist to take a brief look at the changes in the EU-Russia trade relationship myself: my analysis below complements the cited work but is based on more fine-grained data, which offers a potentially more nuanced assessment of some aspects of the development in EU-Russia trade relations.

“The concerns expressed by several EU leaders regarding the cost of the restrictive measures imposed on Russia were justified.” (p. 15)

In response to the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014 and Russia’s support of armed separatist forces in eastern Ukraine, a group of states, led by the European Union and the United States, has imposed separate but overlapping sanctions on Russian individuals and businesses. EU sanctions have repeatedly been broadened in scope and today include restrictions against proponents and beneficiaries of Russian actions in Ukraine, economic sanctions against state-owned banks, energy and defence companies, as well as limitations on economic exchanges with Crimea. On 13 March 2017, the European Council prolonged the restrictive measures for a further six months, until 15 September 2017.

Sanctions are an important part of the policy response to what the EU and the US consider illegal actions by the Russian government. Germany has particularly emphasised the importance of a political solution and has strenuously worked towards a negotiated settlement: in March 2015, EU leaders decided to align the existing economic sanctions to the complete implementation of the Minsk II agreement, a package of measures to de-escalate the military confrontation in the Donbas that Germany and France facilitated between Moscow and Kiev. The provision of economic aid and military capabilities to Ukraine has been another pillar of the Western response; Germany has mostly focused on financial contributions.

This brief assessment aims at quantifying the changes in the EU-Russia trade relationship – which reflect economic sanctions and countersanctions as well as other factors, such as investor uncertainty and considerable changes in the exchange rate. The article also provides evidence on which member states have been affected the most in their trade relations with Russia and whether there are countries or sectors with excessive export losses or gains. This becomes especially relevant with regard to present discussions over burden-sharing and demands for a compensatory mechanism on the European level, as well as the Russian countersanctions on agricultural products, which may place disproportionately higher costs on the Southern and Eastern European countries.

In Sections 1 and 2, the text provides some background on the rationale behind the introduction of economic sanctions against Russia. This will then be complemented in Section 3 by a quantitative analysis of EU-Russia trade flows since 2013.

Continue reading “The Economic Impact of Sanctions against Russia on EU Member States”

The Economic Impact of Sanctions against Russia on EU Member States