New Article on the Precarious Legitimacy of Transnational Trade Governance

Prof. Christian Joerges of the Hertie School of Governance and I recently finished our work on a book chapter that examines the impact of modern trade agreements on democratic policy-making and the ways in which their effects on national governance can be legitimised. The new paper (SSRN download link) is based on a previous version with a slightly different focus that was extensively rewritten by us over the last months. The final version will be published in the forthcoming Research Handbook on the Sociology of International Law edited by Moshe Hirsch and Andrew Lang in the coming months.

A Conflicts-Law Response To The Precarious Legitimacy Of Transnational Trade Governance

The abstract: 

This paper discusses the fundamental tensions between economic globalisation and democratic politics in the field of international trade. New bilateral and regional trade agreements increasingly incorporate other ‘trade-related’ policy areas and threaten to constrain state action and democratic politics. The move towards deeper and more comprehensive trade deals has greatly accentuated grievances and is of exemplary importance in the realms of transnational governance. We examine the decoupling of these agreements from national and democratic control and the resulting legitimacy impasses of transnational governance, based upon the theoretical frameworks of Karl Polanyi and Dani Rodrik. Arguing that politics is not a mistake that gets in the way of markets, we submit our own conceptualisation of transnational legitimacy. In doing so, we suggest a new type of conflicts law which does not seek to overcome socio-economic and political diversity by some substantive transnational regime, but responds to diversity with procedural safeguards, thus ensuring space for cooperative problem-solving and the search for fair compromises.

 

New Article on the Precarious Legitimacy of Transnational Trade Governance

Fair handeln

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In vielen afrikanischen Ländern herrscht Armut, ihre Einwohner sehnen sich nach einem besseren Leben – und flüchten. Schaffen neue Handelsabkommen Abhilfe?

Gastbeitrag für das Magazin enkelfähig zusammen mit Clara Weinhardt

Seit 15 Jahren verhandelt die Europäische Union mit Ländern in Afrika, der Karibik und dem Pazifik über Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen (EPAs). Viele afrikanische Handelspartner befürchten jedoch Nachteile aus der eigenen Marktöffnung. 2014 wurden zwar mehrere regionale EPAs in Afrika unterzeichnet; die Kontroversen reißen jedoch nicht ab. Aus Sorge um die eigene Industrialisierung weigern sich Staaten wie Nigeria und Tansania, die bereits verhandelten Abkommen zu ratifizieren.

Und tatsächlich können sie sich in einigen Bereichen negativ auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung auswirken. Dabei sind weniger die Handelsgrenzen der EU das Problem, denn die Abkommen sehen weitgehende Zollsenkungen vor. Risiken birgt stattdessen die Marktöffnung, zu der sich die afrikanischen Partner im Gegenzug verpflichten.

Schokolade statt Kakaobohnen

Der Abbau eigener Handelsgrenzen verspricht zwar günstigere Importe, ver­ringert aber das Exportpotenzial. Der flexible Einsatz protektionistischer Maßnahmen, wie etwa Steuern, wäre für afrikanische Länder deshalb wichtig, um eine Marktöffnung mit der gezielten Förderung einzelner Sektoren zu verbinden, deren Wertschöpfungspoten­zial hoch ist. Wertschöpfung bedeutet: anstelle von Rohstoffen wie Zucker oder Kakaobohnen weiterverarbeitete Produkte wie Schokolade zu exportieren, deren Marktwert um ein Vielfaches höher liegt.

EPAs erschweren es jedoch, Steuern auf den Export von Gütern wie Rohstoffen einzusetzen. Äthiopien zum Beispiel hat diese in der Vergangenheit erfolgreich als Anreiz für eine Weiterentwicklung der eigenen Lederindus­trie genutzt. (Dazu hier mehr von mir – FB.) Viele afrikanische Länder haben dennoch ein EPA abgeschlossen, insbesondere um dem drohenden Verlust von zollfreiem Marktzugang in die EU zu entgehen.

Die EU betont, dass die EPAs im Vergleich zu anderen Handelsabkommen weiter reichende Schutzklauseln und Ausnahmen enthalten. Das ist richtig, kann aber nicht in allen Fällen die Risiken auffangen. Zwar konnten die afrikanischen Staaten rund 20 Prozent des Handelsvolumens von der Marktöffnung ausnehmen; diese Ausnahmen betreffen vor allem landwirtschaftliche Produkte.

Doch in Zukunft könnte es für viele afrikanische Staaten sinnvoller sein, Produkte der weiterverarbeitenden Industrie zu schützen. Die Länder, die ein EPA unterschrieben haben, sollten bei der Umsetzung darauf drängen, dass die angekündigte Überprüfung der Abkommen tatsächlich verwirklicht wird. Auf diese Weise ließen sich bei negativen Auswirkungen zumindest Anpassungen anmahnen.

Afrikanische Regierungen sind gefordert

Es wäre jedoch zu einfach, die EPAs zum zentralen Entwicklungshindernis der afrikanischen Partner zu stilisieren. Die individuellen nationalen Rahmenbedingungen spielen eine zentrale Rolle für wirtschaftliches Wachstum und soziale Gerechtigkeit. Viele Regierungen haben ihren eigenen Spielraum in der Vergangenheit nicht genutzt. Mit anderen Worten: Die afrikanischen Länder müssen auch eigene soziale, politische und wirtschaftliche Reformen initiieren und umsetzen.

Die Grundidee der EPAs, handelspolitische Reformen anzuregen, ist zukunftsweisend, aber der Impuls für eine strategische Neuausrichtung einer nationalen Ökonomie kann nicht von außen kommen. Viele afrikanische Regionen sind gerade erst dabei, eine eigene handelspolitische Strategie zu entwickeln. Der Druck der EU, die Abkommen dennoch abzuschließen, könnte somit kontraproduktive Auswirkungen haben, weil einige Länder schlicht noch nicht dazu bereit sind.

Fair handeln

Read my new Article in the Strategic Trade Review

STR-Article

I just received the good news that my research article on the state of export controls for cyber-surveillance technologies was published. Here’s a direct link to my article in the Strategic Trade Review, a peer-reviewed journal that specialises on topics such as trade in dual-use items and strategic goods, nonproliferation and sanctions. 

The article incorporates some findings of my Master’s thesis at the Hertie School of Governance, which discussed the same issue from a much broader perspective. I also recently received an ‘Aquila Ascendens’ award for my thesis work. My thesis advisors were Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Ischinger, Chairman of the Munich Security Conference and Professor at the Hertie School of Governance, and Dr. Ben Wagner, who is now a researcher at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin. 

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Want to know what ‘cyber-surveillance technologies’ are before reading the article?

Good question. There is no universally accepted definition and this is part of the problem. The European Commission recently proposed to include all items “specially designed to enable the covert intrusion into information and telecommunication systems with a view to monitoring, extracting, collecting and analysing data and/or incapacitating or damaging the targeted system.” (see pp. 91-92 of my article). Admittedly, this definition is a little more complicated than one might hope and remains both too vague and too broad to act as a good basis for export controls. What is basically meant is a cluster of heterogeneous (and very often dual-use) technologies that in the end all contribute to surveillance, but work very differently and come into play at different stages of the surveillance process. Here is a brief overview of products that various actors in the debate identify as cyber-surveillance technologies:

CyberSurveillanceTechs

The abstract of my new article:

The global trade in cyber-surveillance technologies has largely evaded public scrutiny and remains poorly understood and regulated. European companies play a central role in the proliferation of a broad spectrum of advanced surveillance systems that have legitimate uses, but have also been repurposed for nefarious ends. Export controls have developed into an important instrument to restrict sales of cyber-surveillance equipment and software to repressive regimes; however, these technologies pose significant challenges to traditional frameworks for the control of dual-use exports. This article provides an overview of current developments on the European level and within the multilateral Wassenaar Arrangement and presents the current state of export controls on cyber-surveillance technology. Most importantly, it discusses the outcome of the EU export control policy review, focusing on the regulation proposed by the European Commission in September 2016, and provides an initial assessment of the key innovations and limitations of the draft text. In addition, the article presents an analysis of the current debate regarding the problematic definition of ‘intrusion software’ in the Wassenaar Arrangement and offers insights into some alternative proposals.

 

Read my new Article in the Strategic Trade Review

The Economic Impact of Sanctions against Russia on EU Member States

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While attending a workshop on international sanctions a few weeks ago, I was fortunate to meet the author of the fascinating and very recent article “The Redistributive Impact of Restrictive Measures on EU Members: Winners and Losers from Imposing Sanctions on Russia“. Much has been written on EU-Russia relations following the crisis over Ukraine and important obstacles to a rapprochement remain; however, there have been few other detailed assessments of the economic impact of the sanctions, countersanctions and geo-political uncertainty on EU member states. Because the magnitude of the overall economic effects was a surprise to me – trade contracted by over a third for almost all EU member states and by much more for some members since 2013 – I couldn’t resist to take a brief look at the changes in the EU-Russia trade relationship myself: my analysis below complements the cited work but is based on more fine-grained data, which offers a potentially more nuanced assessment of some aspects of the development in EU-Russia trade relations.

“The concerns expressed by several EU leaders regarding the cost of the restrictive measures imposed on Russia were justified.” (p. 15)

In response to the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014 and Russia’s support of armed separatist forces in eastern Ukraine, a group of states, led by the European Union and the United States, has imposed separate but overlapping sanctions on Russian individuals and businesses. EU sanctions have repeatedly been broadened in scope and today include restrictions against proponents and beneficiaries of Russian actions in Ukraine, economic sanctions against state-owned banks, energy and defence companies, as well as limitations on economic exchanges with Crimea. On 13 March 2017, the European Council prolonged the restrictive measures for a further six months, until 15 September 2017.

Sanctions are an important part of the policy response to what the EU and the US consider illegal actions by the Russian government. Germany has particularly emphasised the importance of a political solution and has strenuously worked towards a negotiated settlement: in March 2015, EU leaders decided to align the existing economic sanctions to the complete implementation of the Minsk II agreement, a package of measures to de-escalate the military confrontation in the Donbas that Germany and France facilitated between Moscow and Kiev. The provision of economic aid and military capabilities to Ukraine has been another pillar of the Western response; Germany has mostly focused on financial contributions.

This brief assessment aims at quantifying the changes in the EU-Russia trade relationship – which reflect economic sanctions and countersanctions as well as other factors, such as investor uncertainty and considerable changes in the exchange rate. The article also provides evidence on which member states have been affected the most in their trade relations with Russia and whether there are countries or sectors with excessive export losses or gains. This becomes especially relevant with regard to present discussions over burden-sharing and demands for a compensatory mechanism on the European level, as well as the Russian countersanctions on agricultural products, which may place disproportionately higher costs on the Southern and Eastern European countries.

In Sections 1 and 2, the text provides some background on the rationale behind the introduction of economic sanctions against Russia. This will then be complemented in Section 3 by a quantitative analysis of EU-Russia trade flows since 2013.

Continue reading “The Economic Impact of Sanctions against Russia on EU Member States”

The Economic Impact of Sanctions against Russia on EU Member States

An Example of the Successful Use of Export Taxes and Its Value for North-South Trade Negotiations

A recurring problem in the discussion on North-South trade relations is identifying good examples that show how controversial – trade-distorting – policy instruments are successfully used to promote economic development. The search is not a purely academic exercise as the case studies can be used to legitimise and defend policy tools in trade negotiations aimed at outlawing or restricting their domestic application. Export duties, i.e., taxes imposed upon the export of raw materials, are one of these instruments and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European Union and developing countries are one attempt at circumscribing their use.

Because export taxes can be used to ensure a price advantage to domestic industries and therefore skew international competition – a good example are Chinese duties on the export of rare earth minerals – or enrich a small authoritarian elite, their use is actively discouraged by many industrialised countries. However, export taxes can also incentivise producers/exporters to process raw materials domestically into higher-value goods or components (that can be exported without additional charges). If used correctly, export taxes can thus promote the economic development and industrialisation of developing countries. Existing WTO rules do not discipline Members’ application of export taxes and only few countries have agreed to binding constraints on the use of export taxes during their WTO accession.

The EPAs between the EU and regional groups made up of African, Carribean and Pacific countries would limit the ability of governments to use export taxes considerably. For example, Article 13.1 of the EPA between the EU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) declares: “No new duties or taxes on exports or charges with equivalent effect shall be introduced, nor shall those currently applied in trade between the Parties be increased from the date of entry into force of this Agreement.” According to Article 13.3, African members can impose export charges only “in exceptional circumstances, on a temporary basis and after consulting the European Union Party […] and with equivalent effect” of existing export charges.

But can export taxes be effective in promoting economic development? And if so, are there good examples that should discourage us from restricting their use? A brief look at the development of the Ethiopian leather industry suggests some benefits from the use of export taxes:

In February 2008, Ethiopia introduced a 150 percent tax on the export of raw and semi-processed animal hides and skins. This was meant as an instrument to encourage industries engaged in the preparation of raw hides and skins for export to shift to more advanced processing stages. Consequently, exports in raw hides and skins dropped significantly in 2009 and remained low, but exports in processed goods (“tanned or crust hides and skins”) almost doubled until 2011. In 2012, the Ethiopian government added a further 150 percent tax on the export of crust leather, i.e., leather that has been tanned, dyed and dried, but not finished. Again, this resulted in a signficant drop in exports of the affected products and the transformation of the leather industry to perform more advanced tasks in country.

The figure below summarises this development. It is based on data collected by the International Trade Centre for product group 41 (raw & semi-raw leather) and product group 42 (manufactured leather products). In Figure 1, I aggregate the different product types into four categories: (i) “raw hides” describes the most basic products, i.e., raw hides and skins (HS 4-digit: 4101-4103); (ii) “tanned hides” constitutes tanned or crust hides and skins” (HS 4-digit: 4104-4106); (iii) “prepared leather” represents more advanced leather processing (HS 4-digit: 4107-4113); and (iv) “manufactured leather products” are all finished leather products in product group 42.

Figure 1 – Ethiopian leather exports to all trade partners

EthiopiaExportsToWorld

Source: own calculation based on ITC data

Overall, the most drastic changes in the distribution of exports seem to occur in close temporal connection with the introduction of export taxes, as indicated by the two dashed vertical lines. The quick second transformation of exports in tanned hides to prepared leather from 2011 to 2012 suggests that the creation of this tax was better communicated and affected industries anticipated the costs. In addition, the adoption of this final processing step might have been much less demanding than the initial transformation. In parallel, exports in manufactured (finished) leather products started to increase from 2011. The same effects are visible in the trade relationship with the EU, see Figure 2.

These findings suggest that export taxes were used effectively to transform the Ethiopian leather sector from an industry focused on the preparation of raw skins to more advanced processing stages, while increasing the overall value of exports and encouraging the production of finished products. Of course, it is likely that other factors such as the growth in external demand, foreign investment and other policy interventions affected the transformation. The magnitude of the effects and temporal connection nevertheless suggest a considerable (positive) effect of the exports taxes on the economic development of the Ethiopian leather industry.

Trade agreements that are too restrictive of this and similar policy instruments might thus undermine national development strategies in the long run. Thus, it will be crucial for all members to the EPAs, the EU and its partners, to actively use review clauses such as Article 13.4 of the ECOWAS-EPA, which allow for regular reality-checks and revisions to the agreements “taking full account of their impact on the development and diversification of the economy of the West Africa Party” or other developing partners.

Figure 2 – Ethiopian leather exports to the European Union

EthiopiaExportsToEU

Source: own calculation based on ITC data

A brief addition:

Below I complement my assessment of the impact of export taxes on Ethiopian leather exports by also including exports of shoes with a leather component. These products are included in product category 64 (footwear), so I select all shoes with some leather content based on the HS 6-digit level. (This equals all product lines in category 6403, as well as line 640420 and 640510.)

I find that exports of leather shoes broadly mirror the growth rate in exports of other more advanced leather products. Ethiopian exports in shoes with leather content consequently increased specifically between 2011 and 2013, i.e., the time period where the government introduced export taxes on processed leather. This correlation, which also can be observed for the exports of other finished leather products, suggests that export taxes may have encouraged the domestic production of more advanced leather products.

Figure 3 – Ethiopian leather exports to all trade partners (incl. leather shoes)

EthiopiaExportsToWorldwithShoes

Source: own calculation based on ITC data

Ethiopia also recovered from the slight decrease in the exports of leather shoes after 2013 in 2016, when exports more than doubled to about $39 million.

An Example of the Successful Use of Export Taxes and Its Value for North-South Trade Negotiations

The UK-EU Trade Relationship: Part II

Looking again at UK trade data, I discuss what tariff costs UK exporters would face in the unlikely scenario that no Brexit deal (or interim trade agreement) can be reached and commercial relations would have to continue on a ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) basis. The analysis is based on product groups established in the Harmonized System (HS) on the two-digit level, which allows to calculate some broad estimates of potential costs, but does not constitute a detailed assessment for each traded product.

1. An Update on UK Exports in 2016

Using data provided by the International Trade Centre (based on Eurostat data), I complement my previous analysis in Part I with information on UK exports in 2016. Interestingly, the data shows that UK exports to the EU increased again relative to 2015 while trade with other regions decreased. The difference between both trade flows narrowed from nearly £38,000 million in 2015 to about £17,000 million in 2016. See below for a brief overview:

UK_exports_2014-2016

Source: own compilation based on ITC & Eurostat data

2. UK Exports to EU Members by Product Group

As I have already shown in my first post, new markets for UK goods emerged rapidly over the last decade and British companies have increasingly found new customers in East Asia and other regions. Yet, a significant amount of UK exports are still directed towards Europe. For three-quarters of all HS-2 product groups, a majority of exports were traded with the EU in 2016 – see below for the quantiles:

0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
2.91 49.95 60.91 70.84 92.62

The following figure summarises these findings for each product category: the x-axis depicts the UK trade volume with Europe in percent; the y-axis shows the number of HS-2 product groups for each segment. The dashed line depicts the average UK trade across product categories with the EU, which equals 58.94 percent.

UK_Export_By_Product

Source: own compilation based on Eurostat data

3. EU MFN Tariffs 

The big question for the immediate future is whether the EU and the UK will be able to spell out an agreement that preserves most aspects of current relations concerning trade in goods. A free trade agreement (FTAs) would, at a minimum, consist of abolishing tariffs on most or all goods traded between the parties, thus leaving both sides free to conclude FTAs with other countries – which is an explicit goal of the UK government.

Preserving the mutual access to national markets that EU member states currently enjoy certainly constitutes a priority for both sides in the Brexit negotiations. The diversity of interests within both parties and diverging priorities – as well as any conditionality on other parts of the package Brexit deal – could, however, render the negotiations on trade in goods laborious and time-consuming. (Of course, the negotiations on trade will also be affected by many more issues, such as product standards, rules of origin, rules on the services trade, taxation, dumping, …)

In case no (interim) agreement is reached in time, the UK would revert back to WTO rules, i.e., UK exports to the EU would be subject to the EU’s MFN tariffs. The figures below describe the current EU MFN tariff structure. They both show that EU MFN tariffs are actually relatively low, with an average (dashed lines) between 4.7 (figure on the left) and 6.6 percent (on the right), and only few extreme values for individual HS-2 product groups.

EU_MFN_Tariffs

Source: own compilation based on Eurostat data 

Of course, there is a technical detail that makes both figures important for different reasons: in the one on the left, the average tariff for each product group is calculated by dividing the sum of tariffs through the number of all products in the group (including those without a tariff). This reduces the average tariff and introduces groups with an average tariff of practically zero. On the right, the sum of tariffs in a particular HS-2 product group is only divided by the number of dutiable items in the same group, thereby creating a potentially more accurate representation of the true impact of the EU tariff on traded goods, but reducing the utility of the figure for an assessment which does not distinguish between specific products and, instead, merely looks at the product groups as a whole.

4. Potential MFN Tariff Impact on UK Exports 

What would be the immediate costs for UK exports to the EU if MFN-tariffs would apply and which sectors could be affected most?

In 2016, the UK exported goods with a total value of £142,244 million to the EU. Multiplying the value of UK exports in each product category with the respective EU MFN tariff yields tariff costs of approximately £5,140 million, i.e., an effective tariff rate of 3.61 percent. Caveat: Because I calculate the potential tariff costs for whole HS two-digit product groups and tariffs vary widely for individual products, my results can only present a very rough estimate of potential costs.

Overall, there seems to be a linear positive relationship between the trade volume and tariff costs, with only a few outliers. Interestingly, product category 87 “Vehicles and parts thereof” would incur particularly high tariff costs (about £1,126 million) – a finding that is consistent with the present debate about the future of the UK automotive industry after Brexit. The 15 product groups with the largest trade volumes to the EU could potentially face the following tariffs:

HS Product Group HS Group Name UK Exports to EU 2016 in £ million Potential Tariff Cost in £ million
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar 2742.44 32.18
27 Mineral fuels/oils 13111.46 190.47
29 Organic chemicals 3963.96 166.42
33 Essential oils; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet products 2643.90 62.71
38 Miscellaneous chemical products 2631.10 137.02
39 Plastics and articles thereof 5603.66 310.11
61 Apparel and clothing, knitted or crocheted 2036.47 236.30
62 Apparel and clothing, not knitted or crocheted 2469.59 285.57
71 Pearls, precious stones, precious metals 2686.91 15.59
72 Iron and steel 2065.63 4.83
84 Machinery and parts thereof 16241.82 311.27
85 Electrical machinery and equipment 10058.70 304.49
87 Vehicles other than railway and parts 17884.69 1125.57
88 Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof 7246.19 222.56
90 Precision Instruments 5083.13 102.23

The figure below briefly summarizes the statistics for all product categories. The UK exports to the EU for each HS-2 product category are plotted on the y-axis; the potential tariff costs on the y-axis.

UK_ExportstoEU_UKTariffCosts

Source: own compilation based on ITC & Eurostat data 

5. Tariff Cost vs. Export Dependency on Europe

Finally, are UK exports highly dependent on the EU as a market and does this affect some product categories with high potential tariffs?

To answer this question, I subdivide the product categories into four groups based on the percentage of goods in each category that are exported to the EU. (See the table describing quantiles above.) I find that the first quantile – the product groups for which the trade dependence on the EU market is relatively low, i.e., below 50 percent of goods go to EU members – account for about £2,092 million of potential tariffs. This, includes several product categories with large trade volumes, for example, 87 for motor vehicles and 84 for machinery.

The product categories in quantiles two and three represent £779 million and £1,104 million respectively. The HS-2 product groups with the highest dependence on the EU as an export market, which describes categories in which more than 70 percent of exports go to EU member states, would incur approximately £1,164 million in tariff costs.

The figure below provides a rough overview of potential costs by plotting the EU’s MFN-tariffs on the x-axis and the UK exports to the EU for each HS-2 product category on the y-axis. All observations are labelled with the two-digit number of the respective HS product group. In addition, the colour of the individual observations indicates the amount of UK exports in the respective product group that is traded with EU member states.

UK_Exports_By_EU_Tariff.png

Source: own compilation; note that one observation with an extreme tariff value of 45 percent (product group 24 for tobacco products) was omitted in the figure.

 

The UK-EU Trade Relationship: Part II

A Conflicts-Law Response to the Precarious Legitimacy of Transnational Trade Governance

I am currently working on the revision of a research article on the tensions between new deep and comprehensive trade agreements – read as: CETA, TTIP – and democratic politics. It includes some important findings of a joint research project with Professor Christian Joerges of the Hertie School of Governance, Berlin. We already made the first draft available via SSRN in November 2016 in the Dickson Poon Transnational Law Institute, King’s College London Research Paper Series. The final version will be published in the forthcoming Research Handbook on the Sociology of International Law edited by Moshe Hirsch and Andrew Lang. 

The new title (above) and new abstract: 

“This paper discusses the fundamental tensions between economic globalisation and democratic politics in the field of international trade. New bilateral and regional trade agreements increasingly incorporate other “trade-related” policy areas and threaten to constrain state action and democratic politics. The move towards deeper and more comprehensive trade deals has greatly accentuated grievances and is of exemplary importance in the realms of transnational governance. This article examines the decoupling of these agreements from national and democratic control and the resulting legitimacy impasses of transnational governance based upon the theoretical frameworks of Karl Polanyi and Dani Rodrik. Arguing that politics is not a mistake that gets in the way of markets, we submit our own conceptualisation of transnational legitimacy. In doing so, we suggest a new type of conflicts law which does not seek to overcome socio-economic and political diversity by some substantive transnational regime, but responds to diversity with procedural safeguards, thus ensuring space for co-operative problem-solving and the search for fair compromises.”

A Conflicts-Law Response to the Precarious Legitimacy of Transnational Trade Governance